penalty kicks in soccer (Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose 2002, Palacios-Huerta 2003) , or the decision to call, check, fold, or raise in limit poker (Hirschberg et al. 2009 ), equalized payoffs across actions that are included in the mixed strategy cannot be rejected. The evidence on serial independence in the field is more mixed, but has found some support (e.g., Hsu, Huang, and Tang 2007) .
There are a number of possible explanations for the sharp differences observed in prior studies done in the laboratory versus the field. Failure of minimax in the lab may be the result of a lack of familiarity with the games that are played, low stakes, or selection of participants into the studies who do not have experience or talent for mixing.
A very different explanation for the contrasting conclusions of lab and field studies is that field studies tend to have very low power to reject (Levitt and List 2007) . For instance, in Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose (2002) , the total number of penalty kicks is only 459, spread over more than 100 shooters. Walker and Wooders (2001) observe approximately 3,000 serves spread over forty Grand Slam tennis matches.
In this paper, we add to the existing literature by studying behavior in two new field settings: the pitcher's choice of pitch type (e.g., fastball versus curveball) in professional baseball, and the offense's choice of run versus pass in professional football.
In each of these settings, we are able to analyze far more data than has previously been available in field studies of mixed strategy behavior. In the case of baseball, we observe every pitch thrown in the major leagues over the period 2002-2006 -a total of more than 3 million pitches. For football, we observe every play in the National Football League for the years 2001-2005 -over 125,000 plays. In both settings, the choices being made have very high stakes associated with them.
The results obtained from analyzing the football and baseball data are quite similar. In both cases, we find clear deviations from minimax play, as evidenced by a failure to equalize expected payoffs across different actions played as part of mixed strategies, and with respect to negative serial correlation in actions. In the NFL, we find that offenses on average do systematically better by passing the ball rather than running.
In baseball, pitchers appear to throw too many fastballs, i.e., batters systematically have better outcomes when thrown fastballs versus any other type of pitch.
In football, teams are more likely to run if the previous play was a pass, and vice versa. This pattern is especially pronounced when the previous play was unsuccessful.
Negative serial correlation in actions is consistent with a large body of prior laboratory evidence (e.g., Brown and Rosenthal 1990) . Pitchers also exhibit some negative serial correlation, particularly with fastballs, i.e., they are more likely to throw a non-fastball if the previous pitch was a fastball, and vice versa.
The magnitude of these deviations is not trivial. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the average NFL team sacrifices one point a game on offense (4.5 percent of current scoring) as a consequence of these mistakes. In baseball, we estimate that the average team gives up an extra 20 runs a season (about a 1.3 percent increase). If these estimates are correct, then the value to improving these decisions is on the order of $4 million a year for the typical baseball team and $5 million a year for an NFL franchise.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I reports our results for major league baseball. Section II analyzes NFL football. Section III concludes.
Section I: An analysis of pitch choice in major league baseball Our data on pitch choice in major league baseball were purchased from Baseball Info Solutions, which employs data trackers at all games and compiles the information in order to sell it to major league teams and other interested parties. The data set includes a wealth of information for each pitch thrown in the major leagues over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] : the identity of the pitcher and batter, the current game situation (inning, count, number of outs, current score, etc.), the type of pitch thrown, and the outcome of the pitch (e.g., home run, foul, sacrifice bunt).
There are multiple dimensions along which pitches vary: the type of pitch (e.g., changeup, slider, fastball), the location of the pitch, the velocity, etc. We limit our attention to just one of these dimensions: pitch type.
3 The raw data contain 12 different types of pitches. After consultation with major league teams, we consolidated these into five categories: fastball, curveball, slider, changeup, and other. 4 In our analysis, we drop all pitches classified as "other."
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Our primary outcome measure for an at bat is the baseball statistic known as "OPS," which is the sum of a batter's on-base percentage and his slugging percentage. In prior empirical research, OPS has been shown to be a strong predictor of the number of runs a team scores (Fox 2006 Sliders are the second most common pitch type, followed by changeups and curveballs.
Columns 2-5 of Table 1 report the distribution of outcomes for each pitch type.
We report four mutually exclusive and exhaustive pitch outcomes: a ball, a strike, the ball is put into play and the batter is out, and the ball is put into play and the batter gets a hit.
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Pitchers are slightly more likely to record strikes when throwing fastballs relative to all non-fastballs, and slightly less likely to register a ball. Changeups are most likely to lead to both an out (15.29 percent) and a hit (7.08 percent); curveballs are least likely to yield both outs and hits. Column 6 of Table 1 shows the OPS (our preferred outcome metric)
by pitch type when the pitch ends the at bat. Foreshadowing the results from the regression analysis, the OPS on fastballs is higher than for non-fastballs: .753 versus .620. One potential explanation for that gap, however, is that fastballs are more likely to be thrown in hitters' counts, as demonstrated in the final three columns of Table 1 .
To further explore the role of the count, Table 2 reports results for pitches thrown on each possible count, e.g., 1-0, 3-1, etc. As column 3 demonstrates, the likelihood of a fastball varies widely across counts. On a 3-0 count, almost 95 percent of all pitches are fastballs; when the count is 1-2 the share of fastballs is only 52 percent. Columns 3-6
show OPS comparisons for fastballs and non-fastballs by count, for pitches that end the at bat. The differences in outcomes for fastballs versus non-fastballs tend to be small when there are fewer than two strikes. On two strike counts, however, non-fastballs generate an OPS that is more than 100 points lower than for fastballs, and this gap is highly statistically significant. The last four columns of Table 2 report the final outcome of the at-bat as a function of which pitch was thrown at each count, when that pitch does not actually end the at-bat. If there are no spillovers across pitches, there should be no difference in outcomes across pitch types if the pitch does not end the at bat. To the extent, however, that fastballs are slightly more likely to generate strikes than nonfastballs, throwing a fastball may provide some benefit to the pitcher when the at-bat does not end with the current pitch. 7 The results in the last four columns of Table 2 suggest, however, that, if anything, throwing a fastball on the current pitch leads to slightly worse outcomes within this at-bat if the pitch does not terminate the at-bat. For most counts, the eventual at-bat OPS is close for fastballs and non-fastballs, but with two strikes the non-fastballs yield lower OPS. Table 3 analyzes more formally the link between pitch type and OPS using regression specifications of the following form:
(1) '
where a, p, b, and k index at-bats, pitchers, batters, and pitch types respectively. OPS is our measure of how successful the batter is in the at-bat. Pitchtype denotes whether the pitch that ends the at-bat is a fastball, curveball, slider, or changeup. Also included in the regression is a set of covariates X that includes indicators for the count prior to the final pitch of the at-bat, the inning of the game, the number of outs, and the number of runners on base. In some specifications pitcher and batter fixed-effects are included, pitcherbatter interactions, and in our most fully saturated models, pitcher*batter*count interactions. In these regressions, we limit the sample to pitches that end the at-bat. Column 1 of Sliders do slightly better than changeups, curveballs slightly worse.
Column 3 of Table 3 adds a range of controls corresponding to the game situation:
the inning, number of outs, and number of runners on base. Including these covariates has little impact on the coefficients on pitch type. OPS is lowest in the ninth inning and highest with no outs and with the bases loaded. The likely explanation for lower OPS in the ninth inning is that on average the quality of the pitcher is higher because specialist "closers" are brought in during the final innings of close games. The inclusion of pitcherbatter interactions confirms this intuition in column (4). In this specification, it is the early innings in which OPS is low. Controlling for pitcher-batter interactions increases the OPS gap between fastballs and other pitches, which implies either that better than average pitchers tend to throw more fastballs, or that better than average hitters see fewer fastballs than other hitters. Column (5) adds pitcher*batter*count interactions. Thus, the identification in column (5) comes only from cases where the same pitcher and batter are facing each other, with the same count, and in one instance the pitcher throws a particular pitch, and on another such occasion, a different type of pitch. Adding these three-way interactions has little impact on the coefficients.
The OPS gaps on fastballs in Table 3 are substantial in magnitude. Fox (2006) estimates that each .001 point of OPS over the course of a season translates into 2.16 additional runs. If a pitching staff were able to reduce the share of fastballs thrown by 10 percentage points while maintaining the observed OPS gap on fastballs, this would reduce the number of runs allowed by roughly 15 per season, or two percent of a team's total runs allowed. Because of behavioral responses by batters, this is likely to be an upper bound on the cost of teams throwing too many fastballs. Table 4 explores the sensitivity of the coefficient on pitch types to a variety of subsets of the data, using the specification reported in column 5 of Table 3 as a baseline.
The three columns of the "Good" pitchers have the lowest third of OPS against, and "bad" pitchers have the highest OPS against. The OPS gap associated with fastballs is smallest for the good pitchers. Defining good and bad hitters in a parallel fashion, we find that the OPS gap for fastballs is present only for good and medium hitters. Bad hitters do best with changeups and worst with curveballs.
The pitchers who throw the fewest fastballs generally do worse with fastballs than pitchers who throw more fastballs. Fastballs do best when there are runners in scoring position; in that circumstance, fastballs have worse outcomes than change-ups, but similar outcomes to curveballs and sliders. There is little systematic difference in the coefficient on fastball as a function of the number of outs.
9 Specifically, we define hitter's count as 1-0, 2-0, 3-0, and 3-1 counts, neutral count as 0-0, 1-1, 2-1, and 3-2 counts, and pitcher's count as 0-1, 0-2, 1-2, and 2-2 counts.
Serial correlation in pitch choice
Minimax theory predicts that equilibrium actions will be serially uncorrelated. In the context of baseball, testing this prediction is complicated by the fact that the payoff matrix changes both across at-bats, and even within an at-bat. The payoff to a fastball, at least according to the choices pitchers actually make, is higher with a 3-0 count than an 0-2 count. The empirical challenge is to convincingly control for the heterogeneity in payoffs, knowing that these payoffs are potentially a function of many variables that are not in our data set (e.g., how fatigued the pitcher is, which way the wind is blowing, etc.) Consistent with our estimation strategy above, one means of controlling for unobservables is to include pitcher*batter*count interactions. In such a specification, the identifying variation comes only from instances when the same pitcher and batter reach the same count on multiple occasions, but the pitcher chooses to throw different pitches.
Even this strategy, however, is subject to criticism when trying to measure serial correlation: if unobservable factors led the pitcher to choose a fastball on the previous pitch of this at-bat, perhaps those same factors are also relevant when choosing the next pitch to throw. On a day when a pitcher has his curveball working effectively, he will tend to throw more curveballs.
To address this potential criticism, we condition not only on pitcher*batter*count, but also on the number of pitches of each pitch type that have been thrown thus far in the at-bat. Thus, our identification comes only from cases where the same pitcher and batter meet on multiple occasions, reach the same count, and progress through the exact same number of fastballs, curveballs, changeups, and sliders in reaching that count, but the order in which those pitches were thrown differs. Minimax theory would predict that for the same batter and pitcher, if the count is 2-1, and thus far in the at-bat there have been two fastballs and one slider, it should not matter whether the slider came on the first, second, or third pitch of the at-bat.
Formally, the regression specification we estimate takes the form: Table 5 reports our estimates of serial correlation using variations on equation (2).
The dependent variable in each regression is listed at the top of the column. In columns 1-4, along with the interactions and controls, we include an indicator variable equal to one if the preceding pitch is the same as the dependent variable. These specifications measure whether, conditional on the controls described above (e.g., the count and the number of pitches by type in this at bat), knowing the pitcher threw a particular pitch on the last pitch helps predict whether he will throw it as the current pitch. For three of the four pitch types, we observe statistically significant negative serial correlation. The largest coefficient is for fastballs. If the pitcher threw a fastball on the last pitch, all else equal, it lowers the likelihood this pitch will be a fastball by 4.1 percentage points. In relative terms, the negative serial correlation for sliders is greater, since sliders represent only about 10 percent of all pitches. If the last pitch was a slider, the likelihood that this current pitch is a slider falls by two percentage points, or twenty percent. The negative serial correlation is roughly half as large for curveballs, and not present for changeups.
Columns 5-8 of Table 5 add the indicators for once-lagged values of each pitch type, which allows us to learn not just whether pitchers repeat the same pitch more or less than would be expected, but also whether other transitional sequences from pitch to pitch appear more or less frequently than predicted by theory. In each of these columns, one of the lagged pitch types is omitted, and all results are relative to that omitted category. The results that emerge in columns 5-8 demonstrate that there is greater nuance associated with the ordering of pitches than simply the negative serial correlation observed in the first four columns. For instance, in column 5, not only is it the case that fastballs follow fastballs less than would be expected, but also, fastballs are more likely to occur after changeups than after other non-fastballs. In contrast, curveballs are least likely to follow changeups (and vice versa), and curveballs are most likely to follow fastballs.
Changeups are more likely to occur if the last pitch was a changeup than it was another non-fastball.
Calibrating the value to a team's batters of exploiting these correlation patterns description (e.g., stadium, weather, etc.), current game situation (quarter, location on field, down, yards to go, etc.), offensive formation, the type of play (run, pass, punt, field goal, etc.), and the outcome of the play (e.g., yards gained).
As was the case with baseball, there are many dimensions on which play types vary: run or pass, direction, distance, movement of players, etc. We limit our study to just one dimension: the choice of whether to call a running play or a passing play.
Our raw data covers every play from regular season NFL games over five full seasons: [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . We exclude fourth down plays, as well as all plays that occur in the last two minutes of the half, during overtime, or when a team kneels down to run out the clock. Because of difficulties in our data of identifying whether the team's intention was to run or to pass on plays where the quarterback runs, and on penalties called before a play unfolds (e.g., false start), these plays are also excluded. After these exclusions, we have 127,885 total plays.
Unlike baseball, where there are well-established summary metrics for evaluating the success of an at bat (e.g. OPS), there is no parallel statistic in football.
Consequently, we construct our own measure of success for a play in football as follows.
First, we estimate the value to a team of having possession of the ball as a function of distance from the end zone, what down it is, and yards to achieve a first down, using a regression taking the form Figure 1 show the estimated value to a team of having the ball first down and ten yards to go, second down and ten yards to go, and third down and ten yards to go respectively as a function of the distance to the end zone. 10 If a team has the ball first and ten at the opponent's ten yard line, that team will expect to gain more than four points relative to the other team by the end of the half. The value of having the ball first and ten declines nearly linearly with field position; having the ball first and ten on one's own ten yard line is associated with essentially no expected change in the half-time score. Having the ball second and ten costs a team about one-half a point relative to having the ball first and ten from the same field position. Moving from second and ten to third and ten is even more costly for a team.
To compute how successful a particular play is, we calculate the change in expected points scored before and after the play (e.g., looking at Figure 1 , if a team gains 20 yards when it is first and ten from its own 20 yard line, expected points scored jump by roughly one) and subtract the average change in expected points for all plays in the data set that began at the same down, distance, and yards to the goal. 11 The resulting statistic, which we call our "success metric," is mean zero. The success metric tells us, in units of expected points scored, how much this play exceeds or underperforms the average play run on this down, distance, and yards to goal.
In addition to this constructed measure of success, we also report results for more traditional, but highly imperfect outcome measures: yards gained, 12 whether a first down is made, whether points are scored, and whether a turnover occurs. 
where p, i, and j index a particular play, offensive team, and defending team respectively.
Outcome is our measure of success for an offensive play. Pass is an indicator variable equal to one if the team calls a passing play, and zero if the play is designed to be a run.
X is a vector of controls, such as the score differential at the time of the play, whether the game is played on grass, whether the offensive team is the home team, the year of the game, etc. In some specifications, we also add team-fixed effects for the offense and the defense, or interactions between the offensive and defensive teams.
The results from estimating equation (4) are presented in Table 7 . The four columns represent four different specifications, with the number of controls increasing moving from left to right in the table. The first column, which includes no covariates, confirms the raw difference in means between passing and running; a pass generates an additional .066 points in expectation. Column 2 adds controls, but does not include teamfixed effects. The relative value of a pass increases to .083 points in this specification.
This specification also highlights the sizable home field advantage in the NFL: an offensive play run by the home team generate an extra .041 points, or roughly half the difference between a pass and a run. Offenses perform slightly worse in the cold. The playing surface does not have a large impact on the offense's effectiveness.
Column 3 adds fixed-effects for the offensive and defensive teams. These fixed effects will absorb any systematic differences across teams in offensive and defensive prowess. The relative value of a pass decreases slightly to .077 points in this specification. The last column of the table includes interaction effects for the offensive and defensive teams. The relative value of a pass is essentially unchanged at .075 points. Table 8 examines the sensitivity of the results of running versus passing to a variety of subsets of the data, as well as reporting results for an expanded set of outcome measures (yards gained, achieving a first down on the play, turnovers, and whether a touchdown is scored on the play). The columns of the table correspond to different outcome measures, e.g. our constructed success metric, yards gained, etc. Each row of the table represents a different subset of the data. In all cases, we include team-fixed effects and controls mirroring those in column 4 of Table 7 . Only the coefficient on the pass indicator variable is reported in the table.
Focusing first on the column 1 of Table 8 , the top row of the table reports our baseline specification. Thus, the entry in the top row in column 1 matches the coefficient we report in Table 6 , column 4: a .075 gap between passes and runs on our success metric. Consistent with this result, passes do better on yards gained, first downs made, and scoring, but also lead to more turnovers. Moving down through the table, passes outperform runs in all quarters of the game, but by a greater margin in the first half than the second half of the game. The benefits of passing accrue equally to home teams and visitors. The best offenses exhibit the greatest gap between passes and runs; for the worst offenses the differential is not statistically significant. Teams that pass the most have slightly smaller edges when passing than other teams.
The results in Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate that the expected outcome of a pass systematically exceeds that of a run -a result that is inconsistent with Minimax theory. 
Serial correlation in NFL play calling
To assess whether there is serial correlation in the choice of runs versus passes on the part of NFL offenses, we run regressions of the form Table 9. 14 Offensive play calling reveals substantial negative serial correlation, with a coefficient of -.100 (se=.003). In other words, conditional on other factors, a team is 14 The number of observations in Table 9 is smaller than in the earlier analysis for two reasons. First, the first play of each drive is not included in the serial correlation analysis. Second, plays for which the preceding play could not be cataloged as a run or a pass (e.g. because of a penalty or a quarterback run) are also excluded.
almost 10 percentage points less likely to pass on this current play if they passed on the previous play.
To further explore the question of serial correlation, we divide the sample into thirds according to how successful the previous play was, with success defined by our constructed success metric The results for these three subsets of the data (i.e. previous play was in the bottom-third/middle-third/upper-third success-wise) are shown in columns 2 through 4 of Table 9 . Negative serial correlation is most pronounced when the preceding play was unsuccessful. Experiencing a poor result on the last play increases the likelihood the team will switch from a run to a pass or vice-versa by 14.5 percentage points. In contrast, when the last play is in the upper-third of successful outcomes, the tendency to switch away from that play type is greatly mitigated (serial correlation coefficient of only -.025).
These coefficients imply the opportunity for non-trivial gains for teams that successfully exploit serial correlation on the part of opposing offenses. Assume, for
instance, that if a defense knew with 100 percent certainty whether a play would be a run or a pass, it could cut the average yardage gained in half by adjusting defensive personnel or positioning. Assume, as well, that if the defense was 100 percent certain a pass was coming, but instead the offense ran the ball, the expected yardage gained would be 50 percent greater than the average, and similarly if the defense expected a run and the offense passed. games. 16 The potential benefit from exploiting the patterns of serial correlation in football is slightly larger than the benefit from calling fewer running plays analyzed earlier.
Section IV: Conclusion
In this paper, we utilize two enormous data sets generated by professionals in a high stakes environment to provide the most powerful test to date of minimax behavior in a natural setting. In contrast to most prior studies using field data, we find substantial deviations from minimax behavior, both with respect to equalizing payoffs and serially correlated actions. These deviations are not enormous in magnitude -meaning that they might plausibly not have been detected in the smaller data sets that have been available in most prior field research on the topic -but are large enough that a team that successfully exploited these patterns could add one or two season wins and millions of dollars in associated revenue.
Our findings reinforce the results of Romer (2006), Levitt (2006) , and Pope and Schweitzer (2009) in demonstrating that high stakes alone are not sufficient to ensure that optimal decision-making will ensue, even among professionals operating in their natural environments. The middle four columns of the table report mean OPS (on base plus slugging percentage) for pitches that end the at-bat, by pitch type. The p-value column reports the statistical significance of a t-test of fastballs versus non-fastballs. The last four columns report the OPS of the at-bat if this pitch does not end the at-bat. If, conditional on the at-bat not ending, throwing a fastball on this pitch benefits the pitcher later on in the at-bat, then the OPS on fastball in the third-to-last column should be less than the OPS for non-fastballs in the penultimate column. Notes: The dependent variable is our "success metric," which is our best estimate of the marginal contribution of this offensive play to the outcome of the game, measured in units of points scored. The success metric is measured relative to the expected outcome for a play at a given down, distance, and yards to the goal. The variable "pass" is an indicator variable equal to one if the play is designed to be a pass and zero otherwise. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The number of observations is equal to 127,885 in all columns. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether this play is a pass. The first play of a drive and any play for which it is unclear whether the previous play was intended to be a run or a pass are excluded from the regression. Controls included in the regression, but not shown in the table, include interactions for down*distance, quarter*score differential, and indicators for grass versus turf, temperature below 40 degrees, and home team. The first column includes all other plays; the remaining three columns divides the sample into thirds based on the how successful the preceding play according to our success metric. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
